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A Systematic Review of the Availability and
Efficacy of Countermeasures to Internal Threats in
Healthcare Critical Infrastructure
Steven Walker-Roberts, Mohammad Hammoudeh and Ali Dehghantanha
Abstract—Insider attacks are becoming increasingly detrimen-
tal and frequent, affecting critical infrastructure at a massive
scale. Recent attacks such as the UK National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) WannaCry ransomware attack which partly depends
on internal users for initial infection highlight the increasing
role of the malicious insiders in cyber attack campaigns . The
objective of this research is to ascertain the existing technological
capability to mitigate insider threats within computer security
systems by way of a mixed-method systematic review. Evidence
was acquired from major sources of mainstream and grey
literature by analysing about 300, 000 papers. Crude aggregated
results were analysed across the literature, the results were
TPR 0.75, FPR 0.32, σ 0.24 and 0.36 respectively, σ2 0.06
and 0.13 respectively. In totality, the literature evidence suggests
that there is high heterogeneity across crude data indicating that
the effectiveness of security measures varies significantly. No solu-
tion is able to totally mitigate an insider threat. Themes when set
against that data suggest that most, if not all, security measures
require breaches to occur before an analysis of malicious activity
can prevent it in future through recall. Such a reactive approach
is not effective to protect our critical infrastructure including our
healthcare systems. Consequently, there is a major theoretical
shortfall in current cyber defence architecture.
Index Terms—critical infrastructure security, personal data
safety, healthcare, data breach, insider threat, meta-data, sab-
otage, systematic review, thematic analysis, unprivileged, un-
trusted, zero trust
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE are more data breaches reported now every yearthan one could care to count [1]. A significant percent-
age of these breaches were experienced in critical national
infrastructure, which includes public health sector, power,
communications, transportation, oil and gas, and financial
institutions. In wartime, these are often designated as preferred
military targets, which when compromised, will cause public
panic, disconnection of communications and disruption to
transportation. Today, the world is in the infancy phase of
electronic warfare. Cyber attacks offer the ability to destroy
or disrupt infrastructure targets remotely and anonymously, in
very stealthy ways. In the healthcare sector for example, many
corporations are interlinked with the government, and hence,
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data breaches can have a destructive impact on an entire nation.
Citizens confidence and the economy will be affected by data
compromise as many companies that operate public services
also have other government contracts and interactions.
One of the major contributing factors to the increasing
prevalence of “data disasters” is the inability to resolve the
age-old problem of what happens when either (i) a person
trusted to use a computer system betrays its owner to commit
cybercrimes, (ii) a hacker casually makes his way past a fire-
wall and sits behind it for some time committing cybercrimes
to the almost certain ignorance of the system administrators. It
is suggested by some commentators such as [2] that security
often works like an onion with layers upon layers of security
zones. It suggests that all it takes is for an inside threat to
slip between security zones and they will become virtually
undetectable, particularly if novel threats.
Catastrophic data breaches are becoming the story of the day
increasingly often. Most recently, as at the date of publication,
was the Equifax data breach in which potentially information
on 143 million US citizens and 44 million British citizens
was stolen by hackers in May-July 2017. Before that was
the NHS cyberattack. There is the Ashley Madison Breach,
the TalkTalk breach, the OPM breach, the CIA/NSA “hacking
tool” leaks, the Yahoo data breach, the Sony data breach, the
MySpace data breach and so on – these organisations are not
small players. These particular breaches have been apparently
focussed on theft, but it would be right to question what
would happen if instead they chose to sabotage or intentionally
compromise a system or infrastructure in such a way as to
seriously endanger life. This is increasingly relevant due to
the role of cyberwarfare in statecraft.
Where it concerns healthcare specifically, cybersecurity has
the potential to threaten life very easily. Most NHS trusts in
England and Wales have application services presented as web
applications with various backing stores, the most common
being static file stores and databases. These are served at
desktops, mobile devices and on ubiquitous devices (including
medical equipment such as patient monitors). If these services
become compromised or are successfully attacked, then critical
internal infrastructure services such as access to laboratory
results, radiography and real-time patient physiological in-
formation will be unavailable. Medical devices themselves
can also be compromised, for example by DDoS on the
wifi networks which they use to communicate with central
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monitoring stations. There is the additional danger of data theft
owing to the exchange of data across so many devices. The
Verizon VCDB dataset shows that over 1200 serious attacks
were directed specifically towards healthcare infrastructure,
which it identifies to be an increasing trend [3]. The recent
NHS WannaCry attack is said by the National Audit Office to
be the largest of its kind affecting a healthcare organisation
in recorded history [4]. Embarrassingly, that report confirms
that the NHS was not even a specific target, but had failed
to comply with policy directions for the improvement of
infrastructure and was still widely using Windows XP that
was at that time no longer supported by Microsoft.
In a critical infrastructure context, the problem was that
policy was clearly disengaged from front-line practice in the
NHS [4]. One industrial research report illustrates that on more
than 51% of occasions, the blame for a cybersecurity breach
is negligent internal [5]. Similarly, another report projected
that cybersecurity breaches were likely to cost healthcare
providers potentially “$300 billion” in the future [6]. The
most reported cause of cybersecurity breaches is negligence,
therefore, it has to be questioned how this can be mitigated
in practice. The National Audit Office identified, that had
the WannaCry ransomware not been disrupted by coincidence
when a cybersecurity analyst discovered a “phone home”
mechanism by accident, then it is likely that significantly
more devastation would have occurred [4]. Therefore, this
scoping exercise must be conducted to understand the threat
of internally-directed attacks in critical infrastructure such as
in a healthcare setting like the NHS.
In the present threat climate, it is reasonable to question
whether security breaches must be as a result of something
more than a failure to follow best practices and why exist-
ing measures are ineffective. This mixed-method systematic
review aims to investigate precisely that issue. A systematic
review is an evidence-based literature review which goes be-
yond an ordinary review in rigorously assessing the quality of
the literature using methods approved by the body of academic
opinion. This approach was used because of the number of
dogmatic practices in cybersecurity and little encompassing
research which challenges that position as being unsatisfactory,
it aims to be a fresh alternative to the typical survey of
computer science literature which provides thorough critical
analysis.
We have chosen the systematic review style to address
the shortage of knowledge about effects of insider threats
against security of critical infrastructure, particularly in the
healthcare sector, because it is a highly approved academic
scoping method within public health in the United Kingdom
and abroad. This is owed mostly to the fact that systematic
reviews are impartial and concise with adherence to a specific
protocol. It amounts to an excellent tool for “proving” the
state of the art as opposed to a subjective (potentially biased)
literature summary in a survey context. The closest work
to ours is the systematic literature review of insider threats
offered by [7] . However, they have utilised a challenge metric
which compounds potential differences affecting performance
and effectiveness metrics for specified algorithms in Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), thus harmonising
data to fit a meta-analysis which would otherwise be inap-
propriate (this also introduces a substantial risk of bias). As a
result, there is an opportunity to conduct an updated systematic
review more relevant to internal threats. The objective of
this systematic review is to ascertain the state of the art in
computer security where the ability to mitigate insider threats
within computer security systems is concerned in particular,
especially as it relates to critical public infrastructure such
as in the healthcare setting. It aims to extract data from the
literature using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods.
The quantitative data extracted will be explored in the context
of qualitative themes in narrative synthesis lending itself to
the mixed method extraction of data from studies. To achieve
this aim, the following research questions will be answered:
1) To what extent are current technologies able to mitigate
insider threats which abuse privilege?
2) What is the current research trend for insider threat
mitigation?
3) What are the most effective methods of mitigating
insider threats?
This systematic review is only concerned with the effective-
ness of existing security measures to mitigate inside threats,
the present research trend and the extent current technology
is able to mitigate internal threats within a computer security
system.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II presents the systematic review methodology. Section III
presents the systematic review results. Section IV discusses the
review results. Section V gives recommendation for practice
and associated theoretical implications. Section VI concludes
the paper and gives future research directions.
II. METHODOLOGY
The following databases were searched: ACM Digital Li-
brary, BASE (GreyLiterature), Collection of Computer Sci-
ence Bibliographies, DANS (Grey Literature), dblp (Grey
Literature), IEEE Xplore, JStor, OpenGrey (Grey Literature),
ScienceDirect, Springer, Wiley, Zetoc (Grey Literature). There
were two reviewers. The search returned 2577 results, of which
474 were duplicates, leaving the actual number of results at
2103. The search terms used were as follows: ((computer
AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside* NEAR threat), ((com-
puter AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside* NEAR threat))
AND (unprivileged OR trust OR privilege), (unprivileged).
The literature search was intentionally cast wide to consider
as many results as possible in connection with the research
questions posed in this systematic review.
Grey literature was searched to avoid publication bias. All
results were blinded as to publication status during the sifting
phase. The review protocol is summarised in Appendix A. and
a statistical summary of the results returned for each database
search are included at Table I.
A. Selection of Studies
The sifting phase is where each individual piece of literature
was assessed against the inclusion and exclusion criteria and
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TABLE I
RESULTS SUMMARY
Database # Results
ACM Digital Library 401
BASE (Grey Literature) 27
Collection of Computer Science Bibliographies 388
DANS (Grey Literature) 0
dblp (Grey Literature) 4
IEEE Xplore 95
JStor 0
OpenGrey (Grey Literature) 27
ScienceDirect 70
Springer 1531
Wiley 15
Zetoc (Grey Literature) 19
Total (474 duplicates) 2577
a decision made as to whether it should be excluded or not.
The sifting process was divided into following six phases.
In the first phase, search results were filtered according
to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, specifically the date
and the academic field concerned. In this case, studies were
selected from the past 9 years in the field of computing. The
reason studies were not selected prior to 9 years ago is because
of the rapidly developing state of the literature in that time
which casts the relevance of earlier studies into doubt. More
than 300,000 results were excluded at this stage.
In the second phase, all results were sifted based on apparent
relevance to the research questions by title and abstract alone.
1195 results were excluded.
In the third phase, the remaining results were sifted on
specificity by way of full reading. The full text article had to
relate closely enough to the research questions posed in this
systematic review. 720 results were excluded at that point.
In the fourth phase, all results were checked in detail
for the presence of sufficient data which was appropriate in
context to the research question posed (“effectiveness”). Many
results were excluded because they measured only computing
performance of a purported novel algorithm, not effectiveness.
Thus, 96 results were excluded at this point.
In the fifth stage, all results were checked for quality
using standardised testing tools for quantitative and qualitative
research (see III-A). The results were further scored against set
quality criteria within the protocol of the systematic review.
A total of 22 results were excluded at this stage as having not
met the minimum criteria of quality.
A total of 70 studies remained to be considered for inclusion
by way of full critical analysis. Of the available 70 studies, 18
were included and the rest (52) were discarded either because
they scored less than R4 for relevancy or had higher than B1
for risk of bias. The remaining 18 were fully analysed. None
of the 18 remaining results were from grey literature sources.
Though it was within the criteria that studies should have a
high impact, some borderline studies were included to avoid
bias despite being low impact. A full result set can be found
in [8].
Fig. 1. PRISMA Flow Diagram
The assessment process was stringent to ensure that only
the highest quality studies with solid findings were considered
for mixed-method synthesis due to the risk that detail could
otherwise be abstracted by the methodology or a poor com-
plementary synthesis. Borderline studies were excluded which
had relevance scores of R3 or bias scores of B2. This was to
avoid any potential risk of bias within the data extraction and
synthesis. Borderline cases which had low impact were still
considered as a mitigation against the risk of publication bias.
B. Quality Assessment
Quality for the research studies was broadly assessed in
four ways. Qualitative studies were critically appraised using
the CASP tool [9] for qualitative research, which is a well-
established method of qualitative critical appraisal. Quanti-
tative studies were assessed using the SURE [10] critical
appraisal tool which is a generic quantitative research assess-
ment tool well-suited to the field of computer science due
to heterogeneity of methodologies within studies. Any grey
literature was assessed using the AACODS critical appraisal
tool [11]. Following critical appraisal, studies were then judged
against the quality criteria of the review itself as set down in
the protocol (see Appendix A).
C. Data Extraction
This is a mixed method systematic review undertaking
Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) approach [12]. This approach
provides an evidence-based methodology for combining the re-
sults of qualitative and quantitative research. In this systematic
review, included studies were analysed in both a quantitative
and qualitative manner and so this is favourable. There were
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two reasons for this: (i) there were mixed qualitative and
quantitative studies, though the majority were quantitative (ii)
more data existed than the quantitative data provided in the
studies alone.
The approach taken to analysing the quantitative and qual-
itative data contained in the studies was to take a two stage
process. In the first stage, results and discussion were analysed
for key findings and moments of importance to the objectives
of those studies. These were converted to textual descriptions
which were then further thematically analysed blinded as to
the author or article title. The textual descriptions were coded
and then themes were extracted from the codes emerging from
the textual descriptions.
Then, from extracted quantitative data, common measures
of results were identified and the figures extracted for fur-
ther statistical analysis. Meta-analysis was planned but did
not proceed because study methodology and sample sizes,
along with factors affecting results, were too heterogeneous to
safely perform a meta-analysis. Instead, the result measures
were aggregated using a crude grand mean for True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) for those studies
that provided those values.
III. RESULTS
A. Extracted Qualitative Data
As described in Section II, all research papers were ex-
plored for moments of importance using the phenomenological
approach of thematic analysis. Though the majority of the
studies were not themselves qualitative, the JBI approach of
textually describing key moments in the quantitative studies
provided significant qualitative data which could then be used
for thematic analysis. The textual descriptions were coded and
then key themes extracted from recurring and similar codes.
The textual descriptions and full thematic analysis can be
viewed in [8]
A frequency chart of codes is provided in Fig. 2 and a
statistical breakdown of the emergent themes in the thematic
analysis in Table II. It is apparent that the most common codes
are: anomaly detection (8), comparison of user behaviour (8),
machine learning (6), behaviour profiling (11), context depen-
dent (5), low accuracy (4), malicious insider undeterred (4),
algorithm optimisation (4) and improvement of algorithm (5).
The most common themes are: anomaly detection (11.5%),
context dependence (14.9%), profiling (21.8%), accu-
racy (10.3%), scalability (13.8%), improvement of algo-
rithm (10.3%).
The accuracy of the analysis is confirmed by the known
fact that IDPS are the predominant mainstream utility for mit-
igating insider threats. Only first order themes were derived as
these appeared sufficient in quantity and quality to address the
research problems. Had the first order themes been subjected
to second order thematic analysis, the resulting themes would
have been too inclusive.
B. Extracted Quantitative Data
All studies had result data, sample data and methodology
extracted and placed onto a spreadsheet as in [8]. That data
TABLE II
BREAKDOWN OF THEME OCCURRENCE
Theme %
anomaly detection 11.5
context dependence 14.9
profiling 21.8
accuracy 10.3
scalability 13.8
machine learning 6.9
undeterred 4.6
improvement of algorithm 10.3
controlling risk 5.7
TOTAL 100
was then analysed for common measures. It is apparent from
the spreadsheet used in the systematic review that 12 of 18
articles had a common measure of True Positive Rate (TPR),
whilst 7 of 18 articles had a common measure of False-Positive
Rate (FPR).
It was noted from the results that a common way of
assessing TPR and FPR together is by constructing a Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve in which a given ROC
curve generated from reported results in individual studies,
or their crudely aggregated results, could be used to assess
study results against the theoretical ideal of TPR 1.0 and
FPR 0.0. In this case, it was justifiable to aggregate study
results because not all studies report TPR and FPR together.
Since study method and sample size are heterogeneous, it is
not possible to weight means together or analyse risk ratios or
odds ratios for known influential factors in each study. Thus
meta-analysis is not feasible nor is a weighted average TPR
and FPR in respect of each study since this would completely
lose the resolution of the data.
The crudely aggregated grand mean was taken from mean
values of the lowest TPR/FPR and the highest TPR/FPR
reported in each study. Some studies did not provide detailed
data but instead an author-calculated mean TPR/FPR. Thus,
it was reasonable to aggregate all mean TPR/FPR values.
Mean lowest and highest reported TPR/FPR values were used
to construct an aggregated ROC curve in respect of 13/18
studies included in the systematic review. It should be borne
in mind that quantitative non-inclusivity is 27.78% in respect
of resultant values. This is, however, mitigated by qualitative
analysis.
The aggregated grand mean was TPR 0.75 and FPR 0.32.
Euclidean distance from the ideal is 0.25 for aggregated
mean TPR and 0.32 for aggregated mean FPR, which is
numerically significant. Mean lowest reported TPR and FPR
were 0.57 and 0.17 respectively. Highest reported TPR and
FPR were 0.84 and 0.36 respectively. The mean range for
reported TPR and FPR values were 0.31 and 0.17 respectively.
Variances among mean TPR and FPR were 0.06 and 0.13
respectively. Standard deviations among mean reported TPR
and FPR were 0.24 and 0.36 respectively.
The detailed TPR and FPR values for each study are listed
in Table III. The ROC curve for ideal and actual grand mean
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Fig. 2. Frequency of Code Occurrence
TABLE III
TPR AND FPR VALUES FOR INCLUDED STUDIES
Reference Non-Ideal TPR Low TPR Mean TPR High TPR Range TPR Ideal TPR Ideal FPR Range FPR Low FPR Mean FPR High FPR Non-Ideal FPR
Gafny et. al (2010) 0 – 0.92 – – 1 0 – – 0.03 – 1
Shabtai et. al. (2016) 0 0.71 0.86 1 0.29 1 0 – – – – 1
Baracaldo and Joshi (2012) 0 0.2 0.45 0.7 0.5 1 0 – – – – 1
”Hussain, Sallam & Bertino (2015)” 0 – – – – 1 0 0.3 0.38 0.53 0.68 1
Yu (2011) 0 – 0.99 – – 1 0 – – – – 1
Bose et. al (2017) 0 – 0.5 – – 1 0 – – 0.92 – 1
Nasa and Varjana (2014) 0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 1 0 – – 0.05 – 1
Legg et. al (2017) 0 – 1 – – 1 0 – – 0.58 – 1
Alotibi et. al. (2016) 0 0.66 0.82 0.98 0.32 1 0 – — — — 1
Mohan et. al. (2015) 0 0.89 0.95 1 0.29 1 0 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 1
Chen et. al. (2012) 0 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.29 1 0 – – 0.1 – 1
Sun et. al. (2016) 0 0.92 0.96 1 0.09 1 0 – – – – 1
Liu et. al. (2011) 0 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 1 0 – – – – 1
Mean 0.57 0.75 0.84 0.31 0.17 0.2 0.32 0.36
Variance 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.2
SD 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.26 0.36 0.45
Ideal 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
values are presented in Fig. 3. It is notable that actual results
are markedly below the theoretical ideal in the ROC graph.
IV. DISCUSSION
The significance of an inside threat was much dependent on
the context in which the user acts maliciously. Both studies
conclude, on the basis of apparently sound findings, that
context was extremely subjective and thus it was impossible
to adjust detection systems to be more or less sensitive
to a particular context-based indicator. Both studies identify
that the future research direction should be focussed towards
discriminating context, perhaps by combining multiple IDPS
technologies together to narrow the subjectivity of malicious
contexts.
Fig. 3. ROC Curve for Mean and Ideal Values of FPR and TPR
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Both of these studies had a moderately high FPR and so
the quantitative data reported in each study tends to support,
rather than contradict, the qualitative data extracted from
those studies. [13], which proposes the high impact SNAD
algorithm, identifies that the algorithm struggles to identify
malicious activity where expected user behaviour is extremely
homogeneous. In support of the above studies, it finds that a
future research direction will inevitably be to develop semantic
models of user behaviour in order to underline context in
malicious activity in insiders.
A. Profiling
Profiling also features strongly within the literature at 21.8%
occurrence within thematic analysis. Of 18 studies, 11 high-
lighted profiling as an important element. This confirms that
roughly 2/3 of the studies included in the systematic review
use historic behavioural data to examine anomalies potentially
disclosing an inside threat.
The TPR values among methods using historic profiling are
higher as are FPR values, when compared to non-profiling
methods of IDPS. Non-profiling methods of IDPS appear to
identify a numerically significant lower reported value of TPR
and FPR. It is difficult to explain with precision the reason
for this, but it is likely on the evidence available within the
systematic review that this is accounted for by the fact that an
IDPS which holds no historic data can not be prejudiced by
historic data so as to exclude it at some future time.
A possible attack surface of profile-based IDPS technologies
is that a malicious insider is either able to skew the historic
profile to repudiate their activity or they are able to normalise
malicious activity. Whilst non-profiling IDPS technologies
report a lower TPR and FPR, they are not vulnerable to
this phenomenon. A number of studies within the systematic
review such as [14] identify that improved signature generation
is an area of future works for this reason.
B. Accuracy
Accuracy features moderately as a theme within the litera-
ture with an occurrence at 10.3%.
It is a major problem within IDPS systems. In thematic
analysis, 9 codes were related to serious accuracy problems
within IDPS systems. The most inaccurate were the alarm-
based anomaly detection system investigated by [15], with less
than a 20% detection rate, and the RADISH system in [16]
with a 50% detection rate. The rates of detection do not
represent a poor study outcome or indeed a poor study (this
would have been a publication bias), however it does present
the need for significant further investigation.
Of the 12 studies the reported TPR and FPR values, it is
apparent that their aggregated values fall significantly below
the ideal ROC curve in Fig. 3. Given the context of the
systematic review in investigating internal threats, this feature
is important because as had already been described, one
malicious activity is enough to be catastrophic.
The inability of any study to reliably prove a 100% TPR
suggests that IDPS is not generally designed to prevent the
types of inside malicious activity that are resulting in major
data breaches. The tabulated range of the TPR and FPR values
reported in studies appears to confirm the same problem.
C. Scalability
The theme of scalability was moderately emergent within
included studies at 13.8%. Studies included in the system-
atic review reported a mixture of scalability issues. These
included the need for greater flexibility in scaling up detection
resources, issues with the flexibility of revocation of access and
the ability of IDPS systems to cope with much larger volumes
of data for analysis.
[13] and [17] particularly highlight that when IDPS systems
are scaled, naturally their TPR and FPR rates are adjusted,
often because of increased inaccuracy at higher volumes.
[16] and [18] suggest that the only real way of addressing
scalability issues is by combining multiple security methods
to mitigate the effect of scalability. However, those studies
do stop short of testing this approach and identify this as an
area of future work, thus it is not possible to conclude with
any level of precision whether taking that modified approach
would be effective.
In particular, the scalability issues identified in the lit-
erature create concerns where big data and cloud services
are concerned. If an IDPS can not be scaled up, then it is
reasonable to question whether it can mitigate threats in a
complex distributed computer system where system activity
may exponentially increase over time. Despite this, there does
not appear to be any data within these studies to prove that
there would definitely be a scalability problem in respect of
each approach taken.
D. Machine Learning
Machine learning features less within the literature at a 6.9%
theme occurrence. This is still significant. From the studies
included in the systematic review, it is reasonable to conclude
that machine learning in IDPS is an emerging academic
interest. Studies take a mixed approach to application of
machine learning in IDPS systems.
[19] appears to be the earliest article of all studies included,
which uses petri nets to classify whether user activities are
taking place in an acceptable order. Conversely, [20] uses
finite state machines to create a fuzzy model of malicious
activity which can then be subject to binary decisions based
on set threshold. [13] and [21] are studies which also apply
inductive machine learning models to determine the definition
of anomalous behaviour. Other studies use k-nn and k-decision
tree machine learning algorithms, such as in the RADISH
system [16].
It is highly notable that in every study except SNAD [13],
the detection rate is extremely high, with high values of
TPR and low values of FPR. The TPR and FPR values are
quite close to ideal, with a low Euclidean distance in respect
of the same. Though this is observed, of 5 studies using
machine learning, only two use real-world data to test the
machine learning algorithms posed. It is therefore not possible
to conclude with any degree of precision how well machine-
learning based IDPS would tolerate real world malicious
insider activity.
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E. Malicious Insiders Undeterred
The theme of malicious users being undeterred represents a
small but statistically significant occurrence at 4.6%.
In quantitative studies, particularly [22], it was proven sta-
tistically that even though users said they would act differently
in the knowledge of honeytokens, those that did know about
the honeytokens were not at all deterred. There are serious
drawbacks with the approach taken in this study because whilst
the study was controlled and participants blinded, as the study
points out employees who could face disciplinary action and
potentially prosecution would treat the situation differently to
students who know the exercise is a simulation.
In the MITRE trade secrets study, [23], employees reported
that they would react differently if they were aware that their
malicious behaviour was intercepted. Regrettably, this study
does not test these results further and so it is not possible
to fully compare this study with [22]. It is noteworthy that
only 4/173 malicious actors were deterred in [22], in the
MITRE study users took significant evasive action to hide
their malicious activities. The issue likely to identify with these
studies is that a malicious insider in the real world may behave
very differently and so only limited weight can be given to the
information conveyed in these studies.
F. Improvement of Algorithm
Improvement of algorithm features as an important theme
among included studies with an occurrence of 10.3%.
Of 18 studies included in the systematic review, 5 (
[21], [22], [14], [24], [25]) identified discrimination of ma-
licious inside threats and the need for less intervention by an
administrator as areas for significant improvement. Since the
study data does not explicitly relate to these conclusions, it is
not possible to conclude with certainty whether the authors in
these studies took an accurate position. However, it appears
on the basis of aggregated TPR and FPR values that these
conclusions may be true of all included studies.
If all included studies require improvement in the same
manner, this could explain the difference between the ROC
curves in Fig. 3. It could provide substantiation to the idea
that IDPS is not designed to deal with novel inside threats.
G. Controlling Risk
The theme of controlling risk features as a small but
statistically significant occurrence at 5.7%.
[21] and [26] both suggest and propose that risk can be
controlled using a risk-reward approach. When a user does a
malicious act their trust rating is downgraded until access is
entirely denied. When a user engages in normal use, their trust
rating is restored.
This approach is useful, but because it is longitudinal it may
take time to detect malicious activities. It only takes a single
malicious activity to be catastrophic. In addition, a malicious
user may abuse the disposition of risk analysis by normalising
their behaviour as they engage in malicious activities to
repudiate their malicious acts. This is a serious drawback
with risk analysis alone. Another manner of controlling trust
is described in [27], but in the context of such a dangerous
exploit could be the only real solution.
It is important that of all 18 studies included, there is little
consideration of controlling risk which one could rightfully
conclude would be important since the majority of studies
confirm that a serious drawback in every case is an inability to
detect 100% of malicious activity and mitigate it. Clearly risk
control is an area where significant future research is required.
V. COUNTERMEASURES TO COMBAT GROWING NUMBERS
OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY BREACHES
It is submitted that the source of the “straw that broke
the camel’s back” security breaches is not within necessarily
unapproved security practices or software failures. This sys-
tematic review highlights that the issue is much more serious.
The existing security technologies most commonly deployed
today require statistical induction and are often heuristic in
the absence of “experiential knowledge” of a potential threat.
Thus, it is suggested that the only real mitigation is a complete
redesign of computer infrastructures to not only make all
resources immutable, but to remove the ability of an attacker to
navigate resources across different infrastructure layers. This,
it is submitted, is the only way of preventing compromise
in a threat climate where a single system event can lead to
catastrophic outcomes.
It is recommended that because the majority of security
measures can not by themselves mitigate a catastrophic inside
threat to a security system, multiple security measures must
be used together to moderate otherwise substantial risk of
catastrophe.
The US Department of Health and Human Resources that
identifies in the OCR Breach Report that the majority of inci-
dents were data disclosure incidents, mostly operator error, or
were internal attacks that remained undetected for a significant
period of time resulting in loss and damage [28].
It appears from the literature that the best approach to be
taken is to incapacitate a malicious insider by removing data
visibility and locking out permissions entirely so that internal
privilege can not be abused. In an increased threat climate
which the literature suggests cannot be entirely mitigated, it is
extremely important that system administrators do not rely on
the automation some technologies provide and remain alert to
unusual activity that may not be automatically alerted to them.
System and software design should take into account the need
to mitigate the risk of an internal threat starting at the very
lowest level.
The literature body generally as included within this sys-
tematic review takes a common focus towards IDPS with few
studies focussing on other ways of mitigating insider threats.
This represents a deficiency in the scope of active research in
the fields of computer science and computer security.
Taken together, all studies confirm that 100% detection of
malicious insider threats are not possible and that to some
extent, malicious insiders are not deterred by in-place security
measures. This is a very important feature within the literature.
In recent years, it is apparent that there is an increasing trend
within the literature towards predictive behavioural modelling
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to identify early malicious activity before a catastrophic data
breach, though it will be clear that these behavioural systems
take time to work and are therefore inappropriate in dealing
with zero day or other novel inside threats.
It is important to note that the literature consensus appears to
be that “malicious insider” and “inside threat” are very poorly
defined and are applied loosely to mean a person, whereas in
practice an insider could be an outsider with privileged internal
access to a computer system.
Machine learning in recent years has become highly promi-
nent within the literature, accounting for a large number of
included studies. These studies have the highest levels of
accuracy in terms of TPR and FPR. However, the majority
of machine learning studies failed to test real-world datasets.
Accuracy features prominently in all included studies, with
those testing real-world data appearing to perform the most
poorly. The reason for this is not particularly clear but may
be because of optimistic modelling. On the whole it is clear
that no reported technique within the included literature base
can mitigate 100% of inside threats, and thus cannot prevent
a prospective single fatal breach.
The majority of studies identify that proposed algorithms
need significant algorithm optimisation by way of improved
signature generation, improved moderation of risk and im-
proved scalability. In totality, the literature suggests that there
is no way to mitigate “knockout” data breaches which could
effectively destroy an organisation, cause serious data loss or
pose a significant threat to personal safety as a result of a
sabotage of critical infrastructure. This is notable.
Theoretically, it appears that the only way to entirely
mitigate an inside threat is to entirely remove privilege. It is
possible that by controlling the degrees of freedom associated
with specific permissions and data visibility, a malicious
insider can be “sandboxed”.
It may be possible to develop a model based upon the
degrees of freedom of a computing resource and a potential
malicious insider. The present literature base as included
within this systematic review suggests that the approach that
needs to be taken is to treat all users as a threat purely because
it may not be possible to identify a malicious insider until it
is too late.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This systematic review was limited in that meta-analysis
was not possible due to heterogeneity across studies. This
is a very important remark because the resulting issue was
that quantitative data could only be synthesised within 72.22%
inclusivity. There is therefore substantial risk that quantitative
data may have been abstracted.
Whilst a qualitative methodology was applied for exactly
that reason, qualitative data may not have made up for
the absence of quantitative data which provides a temporal
dimension to the data. Due to the need for study synthesis
to be solidly founded on very reliable data and methodology
in order for qualitative analysis to be useful, only 18 studies
could be used due to issues surrounding quality and the lack
of quantitative data which was reliable and relevant. This may
have excluded a large number of potentially relevant studies in
a potentially less stringent protocol. Too many studies focussed
on performance not reliability.
The role of negligent insiders in critical healthcare infras-
tructure is only becoming more apparent. Thus, the need for
improved technology needs to be balanced against the need for
user education and policy centred around the user that exposes
critical healthcare infrastructure to catastrophe.
Significant work needs to be undertaken to create more
effective IDPS techniques. Further work also needs to be
undertaken to create a model of threat mitigation which takes
into account the unknown malicious insider whom only need
commit himself to one activity for it to be catastrophic.
Additional work also needs to be undertaken to understand
the nature of inside threats so that new technologies can be
developed around potential further findings.
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APPENDIX A: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW PROTOCOL
Title of Review
The escalating role of inside threats in computer security breaches: a mixed-method systematic review
of the availability and efficacy of inside threat mitigation approaches.
Objective
To ascertain the state of the art in computer security where the ability to mitigate inside threats within
computer security systems is concerned in particular.
Research Questions
RQ1: To what extent are current technologies able to mitigate insider threats which abuse privilege?
RQ2: What is the current research trend for insider threat mitigation?
RQ3: What are the most effective methods of mitigating insider threats?
Hypothesis
It is hypothesised that most security mechanisms reported in the literature for mitigating inside security threats will reveal
(i) a high prevalence of the threat (ii) an inability to deter the threat (iii) no mitigation methods with an acceptable standard
of mitigation. This hypothesis is taken with the view that only one computer security breach is all that is necessary for a
catastrophic resulting event to occur.
Reviewers
Primary reviewer and writer:
Steven Walker-Roberts, Computer Scientist, Manchester Metropolitan University (LLB, MSc).
Second reviewer:
Mohammad Hammoudeh, Senior Lecturer in Computer Security, Manchester Metropolitan University (PhD)
Third reviewer:
Ali Dehghantanha, Lecturer in Cyber Security and Forensics, University of Salford (PhD)
Methodology
M1: Mixed systematic literature review - consider qualitative and quantitative studies
This systematic review uses the JBI approach to conducting mixed method systematic review. The reason is because pilot
searches revealed that quantitative data did not contain enough information to answer the research questions, whilst at the
same time, qualitative research was sparse and many quantitative studies contained a significant amount of qualitative data,
both experimental and non-experimental, which is important to consider.
M2: Convert quantitative to qualitative research by creating thematic summary of qualitative studies
The JBI approach provides a method of converting quantitative studies to qualitative data by extracting important,
well-established facts from those studies and converting them into accurate non-biased textual descriptions.
M3: Weight qualitative research using thematic analysis of methodology, data, results and synthesis
In this review, those textual summaries are then mined and thematically analysed in order to provide a discrete qualitative
synthesis using specific text bodies: methodology, data, results and synthesis. Only textual summaries which were factually
established by the subject matter and methodology of the study are to be analysed.
M4: Identify possible aggregations of data for further possible meta-analysis of original quantitative data extracted
Extracted data is to be aggregated, where the measure of results is the same. If insufficient studies exist which pass the sifting
stage and are aggregable then no further quantitative aggregation will be performed. If aggregable data exists, but little
information exists as to study characteristics or methodology it too homogenous, then data will only be aggregated and
not meta-analysed.
M5: Synthesis based on emergent qualitative evidence and any aggregations of homogenous quantitative data
Both the synthesised quantitative data and qualitative data will be discussed in narrative synthesis with reference to
both datasets, the wider literature discourse and within the context of the themes identified by qualitative synthesis.
Search Methodology
Search Terms
((computer AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside* NEAR threat)
((computer AND (misuse OR abuse)) OR (inside* NEAR threat)) AND (unprivileged OR trust OR privilege)
(unprivileged)
Databases
ACM Digital Library, BASE (Grey Literature), Collection of Computer Science Bibliographies, DANS (Grey
Literature), dblp (Grey Literature), IEEE Xplore, JStor, OpenGrey (Grey Literature), ScienceDirect, Springer,
Wiley, Zetoc (Grey Literature)
Sifting Process
C1: Range
Studies will initially be sifted on date range (studies from the last 9 years), field (computer science) and
originality (must be original research studies).
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C2: Relevance
Title and abstract will be screened for relevance to the research questions posed.
C3: Specificity
Full reading to check that the research study relates closely enough to the research questions and insider threats
to computer security specifically.
C4: Data
Studies searched for adequate data related to the research questions which is well-supported by methodology.
C5: Study Quality
Study assessed as a whole using CASP qualitative research quality assessment tool and the SURE quantitative
research quality assessment tool. Studies then assessed further against additional quality criteria of this
systematic review. Remaining studies considered for inclusion.
C6: Inclusion
Study assessed against inclusion criteria. Any study not meeting the full inclusion criteria is sifted.
Study Criteria
Inclusion Criteria:
I01 Quantitative or qualitative original research study
I02 Must address the efficacy of existing security measures
I03 Experimental methods must address penetrability
I04 Focussed on malicious actors on the inside of a computer system.
I05 Must explore specific security vulnerabilities
I06 Must be a technical paper
Exclusion Criteria:
E01 Non-peer reviewed or secondary research
E02 Not related closely enough to insider computer security threats
E03 Risk of bias
E04 Not within the last 9 years
E05 Lacks academic rigour or no data to analyse from a new study
E06 Irrelevant or not in English
Quality Criteria:
Q01 Sufficient sample size
Q02 Sufficient protection from bias
Q03 Appropriate methodology
Q04 Ethically sound
Q05 Academically rigorous
Q06 Sufficient research impact
Relevance:
R1: No Relevance
R2: Minimal Relevance
R3: Acceptable Relevance
R4: Highly Relevant
Bias
B1: No Risk
B2: Low Risk
B3: High Risk
Record of Findings
Findings will be recorded within a spreadsheet on Google Drive for computed analysis and so that,
when the research is published, it can be viewed transparently to understand the systematic review further.
